Politicians and Firms Export

@article{citeulike:3357091, abstract = {We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries.}, author = {Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W.}, citeulike-article-id = {3357091}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118354}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118354}, doi = {10.2307/2118354}, issn = {00335533}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {bargaining, incentive, political\_economy}, number = {4}, pages = {995--1025}, posted-at = {2008-09-30 11:33:23}, priority = {4}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, title = {Politicians and Firms}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118354}, volume = {109}, year = {1994} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3357091 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3357091 N2 - We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries. IS - 4 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics SN - 00335533 EP - 1025 TI - Politicians and Firms PB - The MIT Press VL - 109 SP - 995 KW - bargaining KW - incentive KW - political_economy AU - Shleifer, Andrei AU - Vishny, Robert PY - 1994/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118354 ER -