Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation Export

@article{citeulike:3789910, abstract = {This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856\&\#x2013;869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225\&\#x2013;239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency\&\#x2013;targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes.}, author = {Crutzen, B. and Sahuguet, N.}, citeulike-article-id = {3789910}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.004}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053108000616}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.004}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {political\_economy, redistribution, taxation}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {264--279}, posted-at = {2008-12-15 16:32:21}, priority = {3}, title = {Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.004}, volume = {144}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3789910 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3789910 N2 - This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856–869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225–239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency–targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 EP - 279 TI - Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation VL - 144 SP - 264 KW - political_economy KW - redistribution KW - taxation AU - Crutzen, B AU - Sahuguet, N PY - 2009/01// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.004 ER -