Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria Export

@article{citeulike:3814426, abstract = {There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford2013Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap-talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework.}, address = {Dept. of Economics, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 873806, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, U.S.A.; yingchen@asu.edu; Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, U.S.A.; nkartik@ucsd.edu; Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, U.S.A.; jsobel@ucsd.edu}, author = {Chen, Ying and Kartik, Navin and Sobel, Joel}, citeulike-article-id = {3814426}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/119389712/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {cheap\_talk, game\_theory}, number = {1}, pages = {117--136}, posted-at = {2008-12-20 12:39:03}, priority = {3}, title = {Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x}, volume = {76}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3814426 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3814426 N2 - There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford2013Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap-talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework. IS - 1 JF - Econometrica AD - Dept. of Economics, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 873806, Tempe, AZ 85287-3806, U.S.A.; yingchen@asu.edu; Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, U.S.A.; nkartik@ucsd.edu; Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, U.S.A.; jsobel@ucsd.edu EP - 136 TI - Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria VL - 76 SP - 117 KW - cheap_talk KW - game_theory AU - Chen, Ying AU - Kartik, Navin AU - Sobel, Joel PY - 2008/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x ER -