Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting Export

@article{citeulike:3815212, abstract = {This paper characterizes agenda independent outcomes in a distributive, or "pork barrel," setting. We assume each legislator has a list of projects for which funding is sought. Each project provides benefits that are concentrated in each district but imposes costs that must be borne by all districts. A bill consists of some subset of the projects proposed by all the legislators. We show that even when there is no Condorcet winner among the possible bills, there can be an "agenda independent" bill, that is, one that is immune to any attempt to amend it by any admissible agenda. We show that any agenda independent outcome has a small project minimal winning coalition bias.}, author = {Ferejohn, John and Fiorina, Morris and Mckelvey, Richard D.}, citeulike-article-id = {3815212}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111329}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111329}, doi = {10.2307/2111329}, issn = {00925853}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, keywords = {political\_economy, power, redistribution, voting}, number = {1}, pages = {169--193}, posted-at = {2008-12-21 09:10:51}, priority = {4}, publisher = {Midwest Political Science Association}, title = {Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111329}, volume = {31}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3815212 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3815212 N2 - This paper characterizes agenda independent outcomes in a distributive, or "pork barrel," setting. We assume each legislator has a list of projects for which funding is sought. Each project provides benefits that are concentrated in each district but imposes costs that must be borne by all districts. A bill consists of some subset of the projects proposed by all the legislators. We show that even when there is no Condorcet winner among the possible bills, there can be an "agenda independent" bill, that is, one that is immune to any attempt to amend it by any admissible agenda. We show that any agenda independent outcome has a small project minimal winning coalition bias. IS - 1 JF - American Journal of Political Science SN - 00925853 EP - 193 TI - Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting PB - Midwest Political Science Association VL - 31 SP - 169 KW - political_economy KW - power KW - redistribution KW - voting AU - Ferejohn, John AU - Fiorina, Morris AU - Mckelvey, Richard PY - 1987/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111329 ER -