Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization Export

@article{citeulike:3815216, abstract = {This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region2013specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within2013region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non2013monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.}, address = {University of Warwick and CEPR}, author = {Lockwood, Ben}, citeulike-article-id = {3815216}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00207}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118911806/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/1467-937X.00207}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {fiscal\_policy, political\_economy, redistribution}, number = {2}, pages = {313--337}, posted-at = {2008-12-21 09:18:22}, priority = {3}, title = {Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00207}, volume = {69}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3815216 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3815216 N2 - This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region2013specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within2013region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non2013monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization. IS - 2 JF - The Review of Economic Studies AD - University of Warwick and CEPR EP - 337 TI - Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization VL - 69 SP - 313 KW - fiscal_policy KW - political_economy KW - redistribution AU - Lockwood, Ben PY - 2002/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00207 ER -