Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents Export

@article{citeulike:3839940, abstract = {Abstract\ \ We provide several different generalizations of Debreu's social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of ” many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003).}, author = {Yannelis, Nicholas}, citeulike-article-id = {3839940}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/j785257ktn1583n3}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3}, journal = {Economic Theory}, keywords = {game\_theory, information, microeconomic\_theory}, month = {February}, number = {2}, pages = {419--432}, posted-at = {2009-01-01 15:14:44}, priority = {3}, title = {Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3}, volume = {38}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3839940 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3839940 N2 - Abstract  We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003). IS - 2 JF - Economic Theory EP - 432 TI - Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents VL - 38 SP - 419 KW - game_theory KW - information KW - microeconomic_theory AU - Yannelis, Nicholas PY - 2009/02/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3 ER -