Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments Export

@article{citeulike:3842887, abstract = {This article presents a dynamic theory of parliamentary governments that incorporates attributes of the institutional system in a country, exogenous events that shape parliamentary and electoral opportunities, and the strategies of the government and the opposition as structured by institutions and preferences. The dynamics are investigated in an infinitely repeated game in which events in the form of shocks to income or government resources occur and the government responds with a legislative proposal that is subject to a confidence or censure procedure and may lead to government continuation, reorganization, or dissolution. With a majority confidence procedure, governments are stable, and if parties are politically patient, voting cohesion within the government is high. A censure motion initiated by the opposition can result in voluntary dissolution of government, and the approach of required elections increases the likelihood of dissolution. If the events represent fluctuations in aggregate income, government dissolution occurs in good times for the government leader and bad times for the other parties.}, author = {Baron, David P.}, citeulike-article-id = {3842887}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585483}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585483}, doi = {10.2307/2585483}, issn = {00030554}, journal = {The American Political Science Review}, keywords = {legislature, political\_economy}, number = {3}, pages = {593--609}, posted-at = {2009-01-02 15:50:13}, priority = {3}, publisher = {American Political Science Association}, title = {Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585483}, volume = {92}, year = {1998} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3842887 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3842887 N2 - This article presents a dynamic theory of parliamentary governments that incorporates attributes of the institutional system in a country, exogenous events that shape parliamentary and electoral opportunities, and the strategies of the government and the opposition as structured by institutions and preferences. The dynamics are investigated in an infinitely repeated game in which events in the form of shocks to income or government resources occur and the government responds with a legislative proposal that is subject to a confidence or censure procedure and may lead to government continuation, reorganization, or dissolution. With a majority confidence procedure, governments are stable, and if parties are politically patient, voting cohesion within the government is high. A censure motion initiated by the opposition can result in voluntary dissolution of government, and the approach of required elections increases the likelihood of dissolution. If the events represent fluctuations in aggregate income, government dissolution occurs in good times for the government leader and bad times for the other parties. IS - 3 JF - The American Political Science Review SN - 00030554 EP - 609 TI - Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments PB - American Political Science Association VL - 92 SP - 593 KW - legislature KW - political_economy AU - Baron, David PY - 1998/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585483 ER -