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Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffsby: Toshiji Miyakawa
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AbstractAbstract We provide the existence theorem of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game model with random proposers. Our model contains a bargaining situation where the coalitional game is nonsuperadditive. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy SSPE satisfying the efficiency property when the discount factor is close to one. Furthermore, we provide examples where the delay in agreement occurs, even in a random-proposers model, when the game is nonsuperadditive.
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