Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers Export

@article{citeulike:4569207, abstract = {Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions, whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models. We compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data, finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process.}, address = {Dept. of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street7th Floor, NewYork, NY 10003-6687, U.S.A.; frechette@nyu.edu; http://homepages.nyu.edu/\~{}gf35/html/econ.htm, Dept. of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N High Street, Columbus, OH 43210, U.S.A.; Kagel.4@osu.edu; http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/, and Dept. of Economics and Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N High Street, Columbus, OH 43210, U.S.A.; morelli.10@osu.edu; http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/morelli/.}, author = {Fr\'{e}chette, Guillaume and Kagel, John H. and Morelli, Massimo}, citeulike-article-id = {4569207}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/118684693/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {bargaining, game\_theory, legislature, political\_economy}, number = {6}, pages = {1893--1937}, posted-at = {2009-05-21 13:33:50}, priority = {3}, title = {Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x}, volume = {73}, year = {2005} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4569207 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4569207 N2 - Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions, whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models. We compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data, finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process. IS - 6 JF - Econometrica AD - Dept. of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street7th Floor, NewYork, NY 10003-6687, U.S.A.; frechette@nyu.edu; http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/html/econ.htm, Dept. of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N High Street, Columbus, OH 43210, U.S.A.; Kagel.4@osu.edu; http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/, and Dept. of Economics and Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 N High Street, Columbus, OH 43210, U.S.A.; morelli.10@osu.edu; http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/morelli/. EP - 1937 TI - Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers VL - 73 SP - 1893 KW - bargaining KW - game_theory KW - legislature KW - political_economy AU - Fréchette, Guillaume AU - Kagel, John AU - Morelli, Massimo PY - 2005/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x ER -