Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information Export

@article{citeulike:4747018, abstract = {This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual bestresponse criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence.}, author = {Jackson, Matthew O. and Simon, Leo K. and Swinkels, Jeroen M. and Zame, William R.}, citeulike-article-id = {4747018}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3082018}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3082018}, doi = {10.2307/3082018}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {auction, cheap\_talk}, number = {5}, pages = {1711--1740}, posted-at = {2009-06-05 06:25:01}, priority = {3}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3082018}, volume = {70}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4747018 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4747018 N2 - This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual bestresponse criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence. IS - 5 JF - Econometrica SN - 00129682 EP - 1740 TI - Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information PB - The Econometric Society VL - 70 SP - 1711 KW - auction KW - cheap_talk AU - Jackson, Matthew AU - Simon, Leo AU - Swinkels, Jeroen AU - Zame, William PY - 2002/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3082018 ER -