Formal and Real Authority in Organizations Export

@article{citeulike:488170, abstract = {This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.}, author = {Aghion, Philippe and Tirole, Jean}, citeulike-article-id = {488170}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2138869}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138869}, doi = {10.2307/2138869}, issn = {00223808}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, keywords = {agency, microeconomic\_theory, organization, power}, number = {1}, pages = {1--29}, posted-at = {2008-07-27 16:15:27}, priority = {4}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, title = {Formal and Real Authority in Organizations}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2138869}, volume = {105}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:488170 L3 - citeulike-article-id:488170 N2 - This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority. IS - 1 JF - The Journal of Political Economy SN - 00223808 EP - 29 TI - Formal and Real Authority in Organizations PB - The University of Chicago Press VL - 105 SP - 1 KW - agency KW - microeconomic_theory KW - organization KW - power AU - Aghion, Philippe AU - Tirole, Jean PY - 1997/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2138869 ER -