Private polling in elections and voter welfare☆ Export

@article{citeulike:4895131, abstract = {We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals, and thus private over public polling. Some noise in the polling technology raises voters' welfare.}, author = {Bernhardt, Dan and Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco}, citeulike-article-id = {4895131}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053109000702}, day = {11}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {election, information, political\_economy, welfare}, month = {September}, number = {5}, pages = {2021--2056}, posted-at = {2009-08-22 13:25:19}, priority = {4}, title = {Private polling in elections and voter welfare☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013}, volume = {144}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4895131 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4895131 N2 - We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals, and thus private over public polling. Some noise in the polling technology raises voters' welfare. IS - 5 JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 EP - 2056 TI - Private polling in elections and voter welfare☆ VL - 144 SP - 2021 KW - election KW - information KW - political_economy KW - welfare AU - Bernhardt, Dan AU - Duggan, John AU - Squintani, Francesco PY - 2009/09/11/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013 ER -