CiteULike is a free online bibliography manager. Register and you can start organising your references online.

Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection Export

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No. 2. (July 2009), pp. 749-760.

Citation Format

[Posts]

View FullText article


YoshiY's tags for this article

agency contract game_theory information

X Reviews [Write a review of this article]

X Find related articles from these CiteULike users

X Find related articles with these CiteULike tags

X Posting History

X Abstract

We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes) the existence theorem of [Simon, L., Zame, W., 1990. Discontinuous games and endogenous sharing rules. Econometrica 58 (4), 861–872] designed for discontinuous games.


X BibTeX record

X RIS record


Privacy Statement | Terms & Conditions
CiteULike organises scholarly (or academic) papers or literature and provides bibliographic (which means it makes bibliographies) for universities and higher education establishments. It helps undergraduates and postgraduates. People studying for PhDs or in postdoctoral (postdoc) positions. The service is similar in scope to EndNote or RefWorks or any other reference manager like BibTeX, but it is a social bookmarking service for scientists and humanities researchers.