Moral Hazard and Observability Export

@article{citeulike:515193, abstract = {The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.}, author = {Holmstrom, Bengt}, citeulike-article-id = {515193}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003320}, doi = {10.2307/3003320}, issn = {0361915X}, journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics}, keywords = {agency, contract, microeconomic\_theory}, number = {1}, pages = {74--91}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 15:44:12}, priority = {4}, publisher = {The RAND Corporation}, title = {Moral Hazard and Observability}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320}, volume = {10}, year = {1979} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:515193 L3 - citeulike-article-id:515193 N2 - The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given. IS - 1 JF - The Bell Journal of Economics SN - 0361915X EP - 91 TI - Moral Hazard and Observability PB - The RAND Corporation VL - 10 SP - 74 KW - agency KW - contract KW - microeconomic_theory AU - Holmstrom, Bengt PY - 1979/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320 ER -