Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5341272, abstract = {We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each player and every type (rather than almost every type) chooses a best response to the strategy profile of the other players. There are no restrictions on type spaces and action sets may be any compact metric lattices.}, author = {Van Zandt, Timothy}, citeulike-article-id = {5341272}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.016}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053109000817}, day = {16}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.016}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {game\_theory, modularity}, month = {July}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 13:49:32}, priority = {3}, title = {Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.016}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5341272 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5341272 N2 - We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each player and every type (rather than almost every type) chooses a best response to the strategy profile of the other players. There are no restrictions on type spaces and action sets may be any compact metric lattices. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 TI - Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games☆ KW - game_theory KW - modularity AU - Van Zandt, Timothy PY - 2009/07/16/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.016 ER -