Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5392732, abstract = {We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162]. On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity [Kalai, E., 1977. Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons. Econometrica 45, 1623–1630] and scale invariance [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162]. We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity , scale invariance , weak Pareto optimality , and ” continuity”. We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant , symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems.}, author = {Kıbrıs, \"{O}zg\"{u}r and Tapkı, \.{I}pek G.}, citeulike-article-id = {5392732}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825609001377}, day = {25}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {bargaining, game\_theory}, month = {July}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 15:14:17}, priority = {3}, title = {Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5392732 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5392732 N2 - We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162]. On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity [Kalai, E., 1977. Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons. Econometrica 45, 1623–1630] and scale invariance [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162]. We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity , scale invariance , weak Pareto optimality , and “continuity”. We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant , symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems. JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 TI - Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules☆ KW - bargaining KW - game_theory AU - Kıbrıs, Özgür AU - Tapkı, İpek PY - 2009/07/25/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002 ER -