On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5542478, abstract = {We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1 shows that a strongly robust equilibrium in simple (direct) mechanisms can no longer be sustained as an equilibrium when a principal can deviate to an indirect communication scheme. Conversely, an equilibrium with one principal offering an indirect mechanism cannot be replicated as an equilibrium in simple mechanisms. Example 2 shows more directly that a payoff profile that can be achieved in equilibrium when one principal offers an indirect mechanism cannot be achieved as an equilibrium profile in simple mechanisms.}, author = {Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwena\"{e}l and Rajan, Uday}, citeulike-article-id = {5542478}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825609001596}, day = {19}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {agency, information, mechanism\_design}, month = {August}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 15:07:11}, priority = {3}, title = {On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5542478 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5542478 N2 - We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents. Example 1 shows that a strongly robust equilibrium in simple (direct) mechanisms can no longer be sustained as an equilibrium when a principal can deviate to an indirect communication scheme. Conversely, an equilibrium with one principal offering an indirect mechanism cannot be replicated as an equilibrium in simple mechanisms. Example 2 shows more directly that a payoff profile that can be achieved in equilibrium when one principal offers an indirect mechanism cannot be achieved as an equilibrium profile in simple mechanisms. JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 TI - On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard☆ KW - agency KW - information KW - mechanism_design AU - Attar, Andrea AU - Campioni, Eloisa AU - Piaser, Gwenaël AU - Rajan, Uday PY - 2009/08/19/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010 ER -