Communication via a strategic mediator☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5724356, abstract = {This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator.}, author = {Ivanov, Maxim}, citeulike-article-id = {5724356}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053109001100}, day = {02}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {agency, cheap\_talk, information}, month = {September}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 13:51:13}, priority = {3}, title = {Communication via a strategic mediator☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5724356 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5724356 N2 - This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 TI - Communication via a strategic mediator☆ KW - agency KW - cheap_talk KW - information AU - Ivanov, Maxim PY - 2009/09/02/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001 ER -