Network Games Export

@article{citeulike:5796661, abstract = {In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.}, address = {University of Essex; University of Cambridge; Stanford University and the Santa Fe Institute; European University Institute and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ\'{o}micas; Caltech}, author = {Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev and Jackson, Matthew O. and Vega-Redondo, Fernando and Yariv, Leeat}, citeulike-article-id = {5796661}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/122430821/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x}, issn = {1467-937X}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {game\_theory, networks}, number = {9999}, posted-at = {2009-09-17 18:02:17}, priority = {4}, title = {Network Games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x}, volume = {9999}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5796661 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5796661 N2 - In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs. IS - 9999 JF - Review of Economic Studies SN - 1467-937X AD - University of Essex; University of Cambridge; Stanford University and the Santa Fe Institute; European University Institute and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas; Caltech TI - Network Games VL - 9999 KW - game_theory KW - networks AU - Galeotti, Andrea AU - Goyal, Sanjeev AU - Jackson, Matthew AU - Vega-Redondo, Fernando AU - Yariv, Leeat PY - 2009/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x ER -