Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions Export

@article{citeulike:5850014, abstract = {This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t +1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t . Effectively, rules are ” players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent . For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.}, author = {Lagunoff, Roger}, citeulike-article-id = {5850014}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825609000281}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {institution, mechanism\_design, political\_economy}, month = {November}, number = {2}, pages = {569--583}, posted-at = {2009-09-29 16:03:18}, priority = {4}, title = {Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002}, volume = {67}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5850014 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5850014 N2 - This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t +1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t . Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent . For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration. IS - 2 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 EP - 583 TI - Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions VL - 67 SP - 569 KW - institution KW - mechanism_design KW - political_economy AU - Lagunoff, Roger PY - 2009/11// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002 ER -