Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5883433, abstract = {The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9] ) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences). The non-manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems.}, author = {Kojima, Fuhito and Manea, Mihai}, citeulike-article-id = {5883433}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053109001136}, day = {01}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {mechanism\_design, social\_choice}, month = {October}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 13:16:35}, priority = {3}, title = {Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5883433 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5883433 N2 - The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9] ) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences). The non-manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 TI - Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism☆ KW - mechanism_design KW - social_choice AU - Kojima, Fuhito AU - Manea, Mihai PY - 2009/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002 ER -