One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities Export

@article{citeulike:5923009, abstract = {We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing literature, we find no general relationship between the limit equilibrium proposals and either the Nash bargaining solution or the median voter outcome.}, author = {Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Predtetchinski, Arkadi}, citeulike-article-id = {5923009}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.002}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053109001161}, day = {08}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.002}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {bargaining, game\_theory}, month = {October}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 13:15:31}, priority = {3}, title = {One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.002}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5923009 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5923009 N2 - We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing literature, we find no general relationship between the limit equilibrium proposals and either the Nash bargaining solution or the median voter outcome. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 TI - One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities KW - bargaining KW - game_theory AU - Herings, Jean-Jacques AU - Predtetchinski, Arkadi PY - 2009/10/08/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.002 ER -