The Firm as an Incentive System Export

@article{citeulike:5926579, abstract = {We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces.}, author = {Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul}, citeulike-article-id = {5926579}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118041}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118041}, doi = {10.2307/2118041}, issn = {00028282}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {contract, incentive, organization}, number = {4}, pages = {972--991}, posted-at = {2009-10-12 13:23:02}, priority = {4}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, title = {The Firm as an Incentive System}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118041}, volume = {84}, year = {1994} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5926579 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5926579 N2 - We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces. IS - 4 JF - The American Economic Review SN - 00028282 EP - 991 TI - The Firm as an Incentive System PB - American Economic Association VL - 84 SP - 972 KW - contract KW - incentive KW - organization AU - Holmstrom, Bengt AU - Milgrom, Paul PY - 1994/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118041 ER -