Implementation of voting operators Export

@article{citeulike:5951335, abstract = {We show that a theory of implementation can be developed in the Aizerman–Aleskerov framework, capturing the main ideas regarding Nash implementation in the Arrovian case. In fact we obtain the counterparts of the results of [Maskin, E., 1977. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. MIT, Mimeo] and [Moore, J., Repullo, R., 1990. Nash implementation. A full characterization. Econometrica 58, 1038–1100] in the new framework. We also propose a restatement of the implementation problem for voting operators, designing a direct mechanism where the individual strategies coincide with the choice profiles. Preserving the original sense of the strategy-proofness, if a voting rule is implementable then no individual can benefit by misrepresenting his options.}, author = {Stefanescu, A. and Ferrara, M.}, citeulike-article-id = {5951335}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.006}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0304406806000206}, doi = {10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.006}, issn = {03044068}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, keywords = {implementation, mechanism\_design, social\_choice, voting}, month = {June}, number = {3}, pages = {315--324}, posted-at = {2009-10-16 14:52:34}, priority = {5}, title = {Implementation of voting operators}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.006}, volume = {42}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5951335 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5951335 N2 - We show that a theory of implementation can be developed in the Aizerman–Aleskerov framework, capturing the main ideas regarding Nash implementation in the Arrovian case. In fact we obtain the counterparts of the results of [Maskin, E., 1977. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. MIT, Mimeo] and [Moore, J., Repullo, R., 1990. Nash implementation. A full characterization. Econometrica 58, 1038–1100] in the new framework. We also propose a restatement of the implementation problem for voting operators, designing a direct mechanism where the individual strategies coincide with the choice profiles. Preserving the original sense of the strategy-proofness, if a voting rule is implementable then no individual can benefit by misrepresenting his options. IS - 3 JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics SN - 03044068 EP - 324 TI - Implementation of voting operators VL - 42 SP - 315 KW - implementation KW - mechanism_design KW - social_choice KW - voting AU - Stefanescu, A AU - Ferrara, M PY - 2006/06// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.006 ER -