Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework Export

@article{citeulike:5961269, abstract = {We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the poll only asks respondents which party or candidate they prefer. When the candidates learn the sample average or see all the data, there are partially revealing equilibria that mimic those of the binary message game. Interpretation of polling data requires knowledge of the equilibrium played as the meanings of poll responses are endogenously determined. The analysis suggests that naive use of polling data may be misleading.}, author = {Meirowitz, A.}, citeulike-article-id = {5961269}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825604001605}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {electoral\_competition, information, political\_economy}, month = {May}, number = {2}, pages = {464--489}, posted-at = {2009-10-18 14:51:04}, priority = {4}, title = {Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015}, volume = {51}, year = {2005} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5961269 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5961269 N2 - We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the poll only asks respondents which party or candidate they prefer. When the candidates learn the sample average or see all the data, there are partially revealing equilibria that mimic those of the binary message game. Interpretation of polling data requires knowledge of the equilibrium played as the meanings of poll responses are endogenously determined. The analysis suggests that naive use of polling data may be misleading. IS - 2 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 EP - 489 TI - Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework VL - 51 SP - 464 KW - electoral_competition KW - information KW - political_economy AU - Meirowitz, A PY - 2005/05// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015 ER -