Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms Export

@article{citeulike:5961308, abstract = {We study implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy.) We identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. These conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments, and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026.}, author = {Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivasrava, Sanjay}, citeulike-article-id = {5961308}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1028}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899-8256(84)71028-1}, doi = {10.1006/game.1994.1028}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {implementation, mechanism\_design, social\_choice}, month = {May}, number = {3}, pages = {474--501}, posted-at = {2009-10-18 15:54:55}, priority = {4}, title = {Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1028}, volume = {6}, year = {1994} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5961308 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5961308 N2 - We study implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy.) We identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. These conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments, and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026. IS - 3 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 EP - 501 TI - Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms VL - 6 SP - 474 KW - implementation KW - mechanism_design KW - social_choice AU - Jackson, Matthew AU - Palfrey, Thomas AU - Srivasrava, Sanjay PY - 1994/05// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1028 ER -