A theory of voting in large elections☆ Export

@article{citeulike:5983700, abstract = {This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters' strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters' utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates.}, author = {McKelvey, Richard D. and Patty, John W.}, citeulike-article-id = {5983700}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825606000698}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {electoral\_competition, political\_economy, voting}, month = {October}, number = {1}, pages = {155--180}, posted-at = {2009-10-22 07:33:03}, priority = {3}, title = {A theory of voting in large elections☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003}, volume = {57}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5983700 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5983700 N2 - This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters' strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then proceed to show that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory. This equilibrium (1) consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters' utilities, (2) exists even when voters can abstain, and (3) is unique when there are only 2 candidates. IS - 1 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 EP - 180 TI - A theory of voting in large elections☆ VL - 57 SP - 155 KW - electoral_competition KW - political_economy KW - voting AU - McKelvey, Richard AU - Patty, John PY - 2006/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003 ER -