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Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules Export

Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1 March 1988), pp. 31-44.

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social_choice voting

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We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.


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