The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications☆ Export

@article{citeulike:6082939, abstract = {The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like ” if a then b ” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.}, author = {Dietrich, F.}, citeulike-article-id = {6082939}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053108000513}, day = {23}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {social\_choice}, month = {May}, posted-at = {2009-11-07 13:59:30}, priority = {3}, title = {The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications☆}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:6082939 L3 - citeulike-article-id:6082939 N2 - The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b ” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 TI - The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications☆ KW - social_choice AU - Dietrich, F PY - 2008/05/23/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003 ER -