Incentives in Teams Export

@article{citeulike:933206, abstract = {This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.}, author = {Groves, Theodore}, citeulike-article-id = {933206}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914085}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914085}, doi = {10.2307/1914085}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {incentive, mechanism\_design}, number = {4}, pages = {617--631}, posted-at = {2008-12-31 07:18:09}, priority = {4}, title = {Incentives in Teams}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914085}, volume = {41}, year = {1973} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:933206 L3 - citeulike-article-id:933206 N2 - This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits. IS - 4 JF - Econometrica EP - 631 TI - Incentives in Teams VL - 41 SP - 617 KW - incentive KW - mechanism_design AU - Groves, Theodore PY - 1973/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914085 ER -