Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods Export

@article{citeulike:933225, abstract = {Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.}, author = {Green, Jerry and Laffont, Jean J.}, citeulike-article-id = {933225}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911219}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219}, doi = {10.2307/1911219}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {mechanism\_design, public\_goods}, number = {2}, pages = {427--438}, posted-at = {2009-10-20 16:08:30}, priority = {3}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911219}, volume = {45}, year = {1977} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:933225 L3 - citeulike-article-id:933225 N2 - Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases. IS - 2 JF - Econometrica SN - 00129682 EP - 438 TI - Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods PB - The Econometric Society VL - 45 SP - 427 KW - mechanism_design KW - public_goods AU - Green, Jerry AU - Laffont, Jean PY - 1977/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911219 ER -