Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective Export

@article{citeulike:950407, abstract = {During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.}, author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A.}, citeulike-article-id = {950407}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586922}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586922}, doi = {10.2307/2586922}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {democratization, election, history, political\_economy}, number = {4}, pages = {1167--1199}, posted-at = {2008-07-07 16:24:10}, priority = {5}, title = {Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586922}, volume = {115}, year = {2000} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:950407 L3 - citeulike-article-id:950407 N2 - During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization. IS - 4 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics EP - 1199 TI - Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective VL - 115 SP - 1167 KW - democratization KW - election KW - history KW - political_economy AU - Acemoglu, Daron AU - Robinson, James PY - 2000/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586922 ER -