All-pay auctions—an experimental study Export

@article{citeulike:4044109, abstract = {This paper reports the results of a repeated all-pay auction game. The auction form used is the simplest possible, complete information, perfect recall and common value. Our main findings are that in such an auction, over-bidding is quite drastic, and the seller's revenue depends strongly on the number of bidders in early stages. However, after a few rounds of play, this dependence completely disappears and the seller's revenue becomes independent of the number of participants. The results are confronted with two solution concepts of economic theory, the Nash-equilibrium and the symmetric Logit equilibrium.}, author = {Gneezy, U. and Smorodinsky, R.}, citeulike-article-id = {4044109}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268105001642}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013}, issn = {01672681}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, keywords = {all-pay, auction, conflict, contest, economics, experiment, game}, month = {October}, number = {2}, pages = {255--275}, posted-at = {2009-02-13 16:17:37}, priority = {2}, title = {All-pay auctions—an experimental study}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013}, volume = {61}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4044109 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4044109 N2 - This paper reports the results of a repeated all-pay auction game. The auction form used is the simplest possible, complete information, perfect recall and common value. Our main findings are that in such an auction, over-bidding is quite drastic, and the seller's revenue depends strongly on the number of bidders in early stages. However, after a few rounds of play, this dependence completely disappears and the seller's revenue becomes independent of the number of participants. The results are confronted with two solution concepts of economic theory, the Nash-equilibrium and the symmetric Logit equilibrium. IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization SN - 01672681 EP - 275 TI - All-pay auctions—an experimental study VL - 61 SP - 255 KW - all-pay KW - auction KW - conflict KW - contest KW - economics KW - experiment KW - game AU - Gneezy, U AU - Smorodinsky, R PY - 2006/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013 ER -