A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players

@article{citeulike:2427818, abstract = {Summary In this note we provide a direct and simple proof of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite action games when the payoffs depend on own action and the average response of others. The result is then extended to the case where the action set of each player is a compact subset of Rn.}, author = {Rath, Kali P. }, citeulike-article-id = {2427818}, journal = {Economic Theory}, keywords = {equilibria, game-theory, pure-strategy}, number = {3}, pages = {427--433}, posted-at = {2008-02-26 01:45:45}, priority = {2}, title = {A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01211424}, volume = {2}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2427818 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2427818 TI - A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players JF - Economic Theory VL - 2 IS - 3 SP - 427 EP - 433 N2 - Summary In this note we provide a direct and simple proof of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite action games when the payoffs depend on own action and the average response of others. The result is then extended to the case where the action set of each player is a compact subset of Rn. KW - equilibria KW - game-theory KW - pure-strategy AU - Rath, Kali PY - 1992//01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01211424 ER -