Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions Export

@article{citeulike:3129201, abstract = {Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.}, author = {Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O.}, citeulike-article-id = {3129201}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010357}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010357}, comment = { ” The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today-since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow” }, doi = {10.2307/2010357}, issn = {00438871}, journal = {World Politics}, keywords = {are, current, defect, future, incentive, is, less, likely, more, other, payoffs, relative, retaliate, side, the, to, today-since, tomorrow, valued}, number = {1}, pages = {226--254}, posted-at = {2009-05-13 17:32:42}, priority = {2}, publisher = {The Johns Hopkins University Press}, title = {Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010357}, volume = {38}, year = {1985} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3129201 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3129201 N2 - Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes. IS - 1 JF - World Politics SN - 00438871 EP - 254 TI - Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions PB - The Johns Hopkins University Press VL - 38 SP - 226 KW - are KW - current KW - defect KW - future KW - incentive KW - is KW - less KW - likely KW - more KW - other KW - payoffs KW - relative KW - retaliate KW - side KW - the KW - to KW - today-since KW - tomorrow KW - valued N1 - “The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today-since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow” AU - Axelrod, Robert AU - Keohane, Robert PY - 1985/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010357 ER -