Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on regular graphs TeX Export

@article{citeulike:6031896, abstract = {Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation, and defection. The simplified payoff matrix is characterized by two parameters: the temptation \$b\$ to choose defection, and the cost \$c\$ of inspection reducing the income of tit-for-tat. The strategy imitation from one of the neighbors is controlled by pairwise comparison at a fixed level of noise. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of pair approximation we have evaluated the \$b-c\$ phase diagrams indicating a rich plethora of phase transitions between stationary coexistence, absorbing and oscillatory states, including continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. By reasonable costs the tit-for-tat strategy prevents extinction of cooperators across the whole span of \$b\$ values determining the prisoner's dilemma game, irrespective of the interaction graph structure. We also demonstrate that the system can exhibit a repetitive succession of oscillatory and stationary states upon changing a single payoff value, which highlights the remarkable sensitivity of cyclical interactions on parameters that define the strength of dominance.}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, author = {{Szolnoki}, A. and {Perc}, M. and {Szabo}, G.}, citeulike-article-id = {6031896}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.4150}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://arxiv.org/pdf/0910.4150}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-bib_query?bibcode=2009arXiv0910.4150S}, eprint = {0910.4150}, journal = {ArXiv e-prints}, keywords = {game, theory}, month = {October}, posted-at = {2009-10-29 11:51:38}, priority = {2}, title = {Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on regular graphs}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.4150}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:6031896 L3 - citeulike-article-id:6031896 N2 - Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation, and defection. The simplified payoff matrix is characterized by two parameters: the temptation $b$ to choose defection, and the cost $c$ of inspection reducing the income of tit-for-tat. The strategy imitation from one of the neighbors is controlled by pairwise comparison at a fixed level of noise. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of pair approximation we have evaluated the $b-c$ phase diagrams indicating a rich plethora of phase transitions between stationary coexistence, absorbing and oscillatory states, including continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. By reasonable costs the tit-for-tat strategy prevents extinction of cooperators across the whole span of $b$ values determining the prisoner's dilemma game, irrespective of the interaction graph structure. We also demonstrate that the system can exhibit a repetitive succession of oscillatory and stationary states upon changing a single payoff value, which highlights the remarkable sensitivity of cyclical interactions on parameters that define the strength of dominance. JF - ArXiv e-prints TI - Phase diagrams for three-strategy evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on regular graphs KW - game KW - theory AU - {Szolnoki}, A AU - {Perc}, M AU - {Szabo}, G PY - 2009/October// UR - http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.4150 ER -