Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation Export

@article{citeulike:3809324, abstract = {In its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior of these systems. In many instances, these computer simulations are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of transformation has its own epistemology. I also argue that this kind of epistemology is unfamiliar to most philosophy of science, which has traditionally concerned itself with the justification of theories, not with their application. Finally, I urge that the nature of this epistemology suggests that the end results of some simulations do not bear a simple, straightforward relation to the theories from which they stem.}, author = {Winsberg, Eric}, citeulike-article-id = {3809324}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1455972}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700003422}, day = {26}, doi = {10.1017/S0269889700003422}, journal = {Science in Context}, keywords = {epistemology, simulation}, number = {02}, pages = {275--292}, posted-at = {2009-03-05 07:46:25}, priority = {2}, title = {Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700003422}, volume = {12}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3809324 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3809324 N2 - In its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior of these systems. In many instances, these computer simulations are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of transformation has its own epistemology. I also argue that this kind of epistemology is unfamiliar to most philosophy of science, which has traditionally concerned itself with the justification of theories, not with their application. Finally, I urge that the nature of this epistemology suggests that the end results of some simulations do not bear a simple, straightforward relation to the theories from which they stem. IS - 02 JF - Science in Context EP - 292 TI - Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation VL - 12 SP - 275 KW - epistemology KW - simulation AU - Winsberg, Eric PY - 2008//26/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700003422 ER -