Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions Export

@article{citeulike:5891618, abstract = {10.1073/pnas.0900152106 What makes people behave honestly when confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain? Research on the interplay between controlled and automatic processes in decision making suggests 2 hypotheses: According to the \^{a}€œWill\^{a}€ hypothesis, honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, comparable to the controlled cognitive processes that enable the delay of reward. According to the \^{a}€œGrace\^{a}€ hypothesis, honesty results from the absence of temptation, consistent with research emphasizing the determination of behavior by the presence or absence of automatic processes. To test these hypotheses, we examined neural activity in individuals confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) gained money by accurately predicting the outcomes of computerized coin-flips. In some trials, subjects recorded their predictions in advance. In other trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying about the accuracy of their predictions. Many subjects behaved dishonestly, as indicated by improbable levels of \^{a}€œaccuracy.\^{a}€ Our findings support the Grace hypothesis. Individuals who behaved honestly exhibited no additional control-related activity (or other kind of activity) when choosing to behave honestly, as compared with a control condition in which there was no opportunity for dishonest gain. In contrast, individuals who behaved dishonestly exhibited increased activity in control-related regions of prefrontal cortex, both when choosing to behave dishonestly and on occasions when they refrained from dishonesty. Levels of activity in these regions correlated with the frequency of dishonesty in individuals.}, author = {Greene, Joshua D. and Paxton, Joseph M.}, citeulike-article-id = {5891618}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0900152106}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.pnas.org/content/106/30/12506.abstract}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.pnas.org/content/106/30/12506.full.pdf}, citeulike-linkout-3 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19622733}, citeulike-linkout-4 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=19622733}, day = {28}, doi = {10.1073/pnas.0900152106}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, keywords = {fmri, honesty, neuroeconomics, neuroscience, social}, month = {July}, number = {30}, pages = {12506--12511}, posted-at = {2009-10-05 17:20:50}, priority = {2}, title = {Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0900152106}, volume = {106}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5891618 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5891618 N2 - 10.1073/pnas.0900152106 What makes people behave honestly when confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain? Research on the interplay between controlled and automatic processes in decision making suggests 2 hypotheses: According to the “Will” hypothesis, honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, comparable to the controlled cognitive processes that enable the delay of reward. According to the “Grace” hypothesis, honesty results from the absence of temptation, consistent with research emphasizing the determination of behavior by the presence or absence of automatic processes. To test these hypotheses, we examined neural activity in individuals confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) gained money by accurately predicting the outcomes of computerized coin-flips. In some trials, subjects recorded their predictions in advance. In other trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying about the accuracy of their predictions. Many subjects behaved dishonestly, as indicated by improbable levels of “accuracy.” Our findings support the Grace hypothesis. Individuals who behaved honestly exhibited no additional control-related activity (or other kind of activity) when choosing to behave honestly, as compared with a control condition in which there was no opportunity for dishonest gain. In contrast, individuals who behaved dishonestly exhibited increased activity in control-related regions of prefrontal cortex, both when choosing to behave dishonestly and on occasions when they refrained from dishonesty. Levels of activity in these regions correlated with the frequency of dishonesty in individuals. IS - 30 JF - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences EP - 12511 TI - Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions VL - 106 SP - 12506 KW - fmri KW - honesty KW - neuroeconomics KW - neuroscience KW - social AU - Greene, Joshua AU - Paxton, Joseph PY - 2009/07/28/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0900152106 ER -