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Safe Kernel Extensions Without Run-Time Checkingedited by: X. UseniIn 2nd Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI '96), October 28--31, 1996. Seattle, {WA} (1996), pp. 229-243.
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AbstractThis paper describes a mechanism by which an operating system kernel can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a binary supplied by an untrusted source. The kernel first defines a safety policy and makes it public. Then, using this policy, an application can provide binaries in a special form called proof-carrying code, or simply PCC. Each PCC binary contains, in addition to the native code, a formal proof that the code obeys the safety policy. The kernel can easily validate the...
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