Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations. Export

@article{citeulike:1203349, abstract = {BACKGROUND: The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting "chromodynamics" is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators use a secret tag until they are discovered by defectors who then destroy cooperation based on this tag. Subsequently, a fraction of the population manages to establish cooperation based on a new tag. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We derive a mathematical description of stochastic evolutionary dynamics of tag-based cooperation in populations of finite size. Benefit and cost of cooperation are given by b and c. We find that cooperators are more abundant than defectors if b/c > 1+2u/v, where u is the mutation rate changing only the strategy and v is the mutation rate changing strategy and tag. We study specific assumptions for u and v in two genetic models and one cultural model. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: In a genetic model, tag-based cooperation only evolves if a gene encodes both strategy and tag. In a cultural model with equal mutation rates between all possible phenotypes (tags and behaviors), the crucial condition is b/c > (K+1)/(K-1), where K is the number of tags. A larger number of tags requires a smaller benefit-to-cost ratio. In the limit of many different tags, the condition for cooperators to have a higher average abundance than defectors becomes b > c.}, address = {Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America.}, author = {Traulsen, A. and Nowak, M. A.}, citeulike-article-id = {1203349}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000270}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17342204}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=17342204}, doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0000270}, issn = {1932-6203}, journal = {PLoS ONE}, posted-at = {2007-04-03 08:54:41}, priority = {2}, title = {Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations.}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000270}, volume = {2}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1203349 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1203349 N2 - BACKGROUND: The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting "chromodynamics" is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators use a secret tag until they are discovered by defectors who then destroy cooperation based on this tag. Subsequently, a fraction of the population manages to establish cooperation based on a new tag. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We derive a mathematical description of stochastic evolutionary dynamics of tag-based cooperation in populations of finite size. Benefit and cost of cooperation are given by b and c. We find that cooperators are more abundant than defectors if b/c > 1+2u/v, where u is the mutation rate changing only the strategy and v is the mutation rate changing strategy and tag. We study specific assumptions for u and v in two genetic models and one cultural model. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: In a genetic model, tag-based cooperation only evolves if a gene encodes both strategy and tag. In a cultural model with equal mutation rates between all possible phenotypes (tags and behaviors), the crucial condition is b/c > (K+1)/(K-1), where K is the number of tags. A larger number of tags requires a smaller benefit-to-cost ratio. In the limit of many different tags, the condition for cooperators to have a higher average abundance than defectors becomes b > c. JF - PLoS ONE SN - 1932-6203 AD - Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America. TI - Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations. VL - 2 AU - Traulsen, A AU - Nowak, MA PY - 2007/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000270 ER -