CiteULike is a free online bibliography manager. Register and you can start organising your references online.

Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction Export

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2. (1991), pp. 351-374.

Citation Format

[Posts]

View FullText article


cblock's tags for this article

convergence double-auction efficiency

X Reviews [Write a review of this article]

X Find related articles from these CiteULike users

X Find related articles with these CiteULike tags

X Posting History

X Abstract

This paper concerns a Bayesian game model of the Buyer's Bid Double Auction, which is a procedure for organizing trade that selects a market-clearing price from a list of offers/bids. Strategic misrepresentation by traders may make the outcome of trade inefficient. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) showed that misrepresentation and inefficiency quickly converge to zero as the number of traders on each side of the market increases. This is extended here to cases in which the number of buyers may differ from the number of sellers. The existence of equilibria in a generic instance of the model is also proven.


X BibTeX record

X RIS record


Privacy Statement | Terms & Conditions
CiteULike organises scholarly (or academic) papers or literature and provides bibliographic (which means it makes bibliographies) for universities and higher education establishments. It helps undergraduates and postgraduates. People studying for PhDs or in postdoctoral (postdoc) positions. The service is similar in scope to EndNote or RefWorks or any other reference manager like BibTeX, but it is a social bookmarking service for scientists and humanities researchers.