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Bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctionsPower Systems, IEEE Transactions on In Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, Vol. 20, No. 1. (2005), pp. 50-58.
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AbstractIn this paper, the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions is studied. We model electricity double-sided auctions as dynamic systems and use Nash-Cournot strategies for the market participants (generating firms and load serving entities). Through simulation studies, we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double-sided auctions to those of electricity supplier-only auctions (using the developed bidding strategies).
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