Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games Export

@article{SamuelsonAND:1992, abstract = {We examine dynamic models of evolutionary selection processes on asymmetric two-player games. Conditions are established under which dynamic selection processes will yield outcomes that respect iterated strict dominance. The addition of a stability requirement ensures that outcomes will be Nash equilibria. However, we find that stable outcomes need not respect weak dominance, and hence need not yield perfect equilibria. We conclude that evolutionary arguments readily motivate such equilibrium oncepts as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium, but appear to provide little basis for even such simple refinements of Nash equilibrium as the recommendation that dominated strategies not be played.}, author = {Samuelson, L. and Zhang, J.}, citeulike-article-id = {5996995}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-F}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/002205319290041F}, doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-F}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {article, dynamics, equilibrium, evol-game, evolution, evolutionary, game-theory, selection, stability}, month = {August}, number = {2}, pages = {363--391}, posted-at = {2009-10-23 09:26:25}, priority = {2}, title = {Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-F}, volume = {57}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - SamuelsonAND:1992 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5996995 N2 - We examine dynamic models of evolutionary selection processes on asymmetric two-player games. Conditions are established under which dynamic selection processes will yield outcomes that respect iterated strict dominance. The addition of a stability requirement ensures that outcomes will be Nash equilibria. However, we find that stable outcomes need not respect weak dominance, and hence need not yield perfect equilibria. We conclude that evolutionary arguments readily motivate such equilibrium oncepts as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium, but appear to provide little basis for even such simple refinements of Nash equilibrium as the recommendation that dominated strategies not be played. IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 EP - 391 TI - Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games VL - 57 SP - 363 KW - article KW - dynamics KW - equilibrium KW - evol-game KW - evolution KW - evolutionary KW - game-theory KW - selection KW - stability AU - Samuelson, L AU - Zhang, J PY - 1992/08// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-F ER -