VIII–Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance Export

@article{Joyce07, abstract = {Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the deliverances of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another person, as a model for what to believe. The paper aims to clarify the nature of epistemic deference in probabilistic contexts, to explain the conditions under which deference is appropriate, and to examine deference to objective chances, as epitomized in David Lewis's Principal Principle. This latter analysis will show, in contrast with views that portray chance as an ideal inductive logician with total recall, that our deference to chance is grounded in contingent limitations on our ability to access information and our recognition that the physical probabilities that instantiate the actual chances codify all the types of information that humans are able to possess.}, author = {Joyce, James M.}, citeulike-article-id = {2157661}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, keywords = {deference, social\_epistemology}, number = {1pt2}, pages = {187--206}, posted-at = {2007-12-21 23:02:04}, priority = {2}, title = {VIII–Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x}, volume = {107}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - Joyce07 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2157661 N2 - Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the deliverances of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another person, as a model for what to believe. The paper aims to clarify the nature of epistemic deference in probabilistic contexts, to explain the conditions under which deference is appropriate, and to examine deference to objective chances, as epitomized in David Lewis's Principal Principle. This latter analysis will show, in contrast with views that portray chance as an ideal inductive logician with total recall, that our deference to chance is grounded in contingent limitations on our ability to access information and our recognition that the physical probabilities that instantiate the actual chances codify all the types of information that humans are able to possess. IS - 1pt2 JF - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society EP - 206 TI - VIII–Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance VL - 107 SP - 187 KW - deference KW - social_epistemology AU - Joyce, James PY - 2007/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x ER -