![]() |
CiteULike | ![]() |
dartar's CiteULike | ![]() |
![]() |
|
![]() |
Register | ![]() |
Log in | ![]() |
Cognitive architecture and descent with modificationby: Gary F. Marcus
Cognition In Genes, Brain and Cognition: A Roadmap for the Cognitive Scientist, Vol. 101, No. 2. (September 2006), pp. 443-465.
|
Reviews
[Write a review of this article]
Find related articles from these CiteULike users
Find related articles with these CiteULike tags
Posting History
AbstractAgainst a background of recent progress in developmental neuroscience, some of which has been taken as challenging to the modularity hypothesis of Fodor (1983), this article contrasts two competing conceptions of modularity: sui generis modularity, according to which modules are treated as independent neurocognitive entities that owe nothing to one another, and descent-with-modification modularity, according to which current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. I argue that sui generis modularity is incompatible with a range of data, from the co-occurrence of deficits to the patterns of activation in neuroimaging studies, but that same range of data is compatible with descent-with-modification modularity. Furthermore, I argue that the latter conception of modularity may have important implications for the practice and conception of fields such as developmental disorders and linguistics.
BibTeX record
RIS record