Threshold Effects of Corruption: Theory and Evidence Export

@article{citeulike:2931274, abstract = {Summary We examine the impact of corruption on the quality of public infrastructure. We propose a model in which private vendors supply governments with inputs necessary for the production of public goods. Asymmetric information between the two parties creates opportunities for vendors to earn profits. These profits can be re-distributed to government bureaucrats without impacting on the contractual form, as long as firms do not operate at a loss. Thus corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods only when it crosses a threshold. These results are examined in a sample of up to 125 countries. Consistent with our theory, we find strong evidence of a "corruption threshold."}, author = {Bose, Niloy and Capasso, Salvatore and Murshid, Antu P.}, citeulike-article-id = {2931274}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.022}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-4SJ9KWH-1/1/233c25b8c790c6c1774e1170f5905e46}, doi = {10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.022}, journal = {World Development}, keywords = {juliepaper}, month = {July}, number = {7}, pages = {1173--1191}, posted-at = {2008-06-26 16:15:07}, priority = {2}, title = {Threshold Effects of Corruption: Theory and Evidence}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.022}, volume = {36}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2931274 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2931274 N2 - Summary We examine the impact of corruption on the quality of public infrastructure. We propose a model in which private vendors supply governments with inputs necessary for the production of public goods. Asymmetric information between the two parties creates opportunities for vendors to earn profits. These profits can be re-distributed to government bureaucrats without impacting on the contractual form, as long as firms do not operate at a loss. Thus corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods only when it crosses a threshold. These results are examined in a sample of up to 125 countries. Consistent with our theory, we find strong evidence of a "corruption threshold." IS - 7 JF - World Development EP - 1191 TI - Threshold Effects of Corruption: Theory and Evidence VL - 36 SP - 1173 KW - juliepaper AU - Bose, Niloy AU - Capasso, Salvatore AU - Murshid, Antu PY - 2008/07// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.022 ER -