RADICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT APPROACH TO POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN Export

@article{citeulike:5983525, abstract = {A typical argument in Marxist and radical writings on economic organization is that prevailing practices, rather than being the most efficient, have been adopted in order to increase the share of the surplus of capitalists. Using an incomplete contract approach, this article develops a model which demonstrates how and when adopting an inferior economic organization could be profit maximizing. This model makes possible a detailed discussion of the conditions under which Marxist and radical claims about, for example, `deskilling', can be expected to hold. It is demonstrated that such claims could be derived using standard formal economic arguments. However, the model also shows that these claims are likely to be valid only under certain circumstances. 10.1177/104346300012001003}, author = {Denrell, Jerker}, citeulike-article-id = {5983525}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346300012001003}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://rss.sagepub.com/content/12/1/39.abstract}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://rss.sagepub.com/content/12/1/39.full.pdf}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1177/104346300012001003}, journal = {Rationality and Society}, keywords = {approach, contract, design, incomplete, organization, organizational, power, radical, theory}, month = {February}, number = {1}, pages = {39--66}, posted-at = {2009-10-22 04:41:57}, priority = {3}, title = {RADICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT APPROACH TO POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346300012001003}, volume = {12}, year = {2000} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5983525 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5983525 N2 - A typical argument in Marxist and radical writings on economic organization is that prevailing practices, rather than being the most efficient, have been adopted in order to increase the share of the surplus of capitalists. Using an incomplete contract approach, this article develops a model which demonstrates how and when adopting an inferior economic organization could be profit maximizing. This model makes possible a detailed discussion of the conditions under which Marxist and radical claims about, for example, `deskilling', can be expected to hold. It is demonstrated that such claims could be derived using standard formal economic arguments. However, the model also shows that these claims are likely to be valid only under certain circumstances. 10.1177/104346300012001003 IS - 1 JF - Rationality and Society EP - 66 TI - RADICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACT APPROACH TO POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN VL - 12 SP - 39 KW - approach KW - contract KW - design KW - incomplete KW - organization KW - organizational KW - power KW - radical KW - theory AU - Denrell, Jerker PY - 2000/02/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346300012001003 ER -