Imitation Versus Communication: Testing for Human-Like Intelligence Export

@article{citeulike:4686181, abstract = {Abstract\ \ Turing's Imitation Game is often viewed as a test for theorised machines that could 'think' and/or demonstrate 'intelligence'. However, contrary to Turing's apparent intent, it can be shown that Turing's Test is essentially a test for humans only. Such a test does not provide for theorised artificial intellects with human-like, but not human-exact, intellectual capabilities. As an attempt to bypass this limitation, I explore the notion of shifting the goal posts of the Turing Test, and related tests such as the Total Turing Test, away from the exact imitation of human capabilities, and towards communication with humans instead. While the continued philosophical relevance of such tests is open to debate, the outcome is a different class of tests which are, unlike the Turing Test, immune to failure by means of sub-cognitive questioning techniques. I suggest that attempting to instantiate such tests could potentially be more scientifically and pragmatically relevant to some Artificial Intelligence researchers, than instantiating a Turing Test, due to the focus on producing a variety of goal directed outcomes through communicative methods, as opposed to the Turing Test's emphasis on 'fooling' an Examiner.}, author = {Cullen, Jamie}, citeulike-article-id = {4686181}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9149-3}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/c0233776115358g4}, doi = {10.1007/s11023-009-9149-3}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, keywords = {ai, communication, computation, hermeneutic, machine\_learning}, posted-at = {2009-05-31 06:17:41}, priority = {5}, title = {Imitation Versus Communication: Testing for Human-Like Intelligence}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9149-3} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4686181 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4686181 N2 - Abstract  Turing’s Imitation Game is often viewed as a test for theorised machines that could ‘think’ and/or demonstrate ‘intelligence’. However, contrary to Turing’s apparent intent, it can be shown that Turing’s Test is essentially a test for humans only. Such a test does not provide for theorised artificial intellects with human-like, but not human-exact, intellectual capabilities. As an attempt to bypass this limitation, I explore the notion of shifting the goal posts of the Turing Test, and related tests such as the Total Turing Test, away from the exact imitation of human capabilities, and towards communication with humans instead. While the continued philosophical relevance of such tests is open to debate, the outcome is a different class of tests which are, unlike the Turing Test, immune to failure by means of sub-cognitive questioning techniques. I suggest that attempting to instantiate such tests could potentially be more scientifically and pragmatically relevant to some Artificial Intelligence researchers, than instantiating a Turing Test, due to the focus on producing a variety of goal directed outcomes through communicative methods, as opposed to the Turing Test’s emphasis on ‘fooling’ an Examiner. JF - Minds and Machines TI - Imitation Versus Communication: Testing for Human-Like Intelligence KW - ai KW - communication KW - computation KW - hermeneutic KW - machine_learning AU - Cullen, Jamie UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9149-3 ER -