Embodied Cognition and the Percept/Concept Distinction Export

@misc{citeulike:5692240, abstract = {Embodied cognition, a theoretical framework which extends the definition of cognitive activity to include bodily interactions with the world, stands as a challenge to the conventional view of cognition as primarily abstract, rule-based symbol manipulation in the brain. Proponents of embodied cognition downplay or altogether deny the existence of such an abstract conceptual system independent from perception. This paper integrates theory and evidence across many domains in cognitive science, in an attempt to evaluate the claim of some embodied cognition proponents that modal, perceptual activity can account for most or all of the cognitive phenomena traditionally viewed as "conceptual". I find that much of the evidence presented as support for either side is misleading, as it is based on the assumption that existing theories are far more complete than they really are. Nevertheless, I conclude that there is enough strong evidence to support several key claims, including the existence of perceptual components in conceptual thought, and the inability of some classes of propositional conceptual system to adequately explain the full range of human conceptual phenomena.}, author = {Hayward, Michael}, citeulike-article-id = {5692240}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.6241}, keywords = {categories, cognitive, computational, conceptual, embodiment, perception}, posted-at = {2009-08-31 16:44:23}, priority = {2}, title = {Embodied Cognition and the Percept/Concept Distinction}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.6241}, year = {1998} }

TY - ELEC ID - citeulike:5692240 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5692240 N2 - Embodied cognition, a theoretical framework which extends the definition of cognitive activity to include bodily interactions with the world, stands as a challenge to the conventional view of cognition as primarily abstract, rule-based symbol manipulation in the brain. Proponents of embodied cognition downplay or altogether deny the existence of such an abstract conceptual system independent from perception. This paper integrates theory and evidence across many domains in cognitive science, in an attempt to evaluate the claim of some embodied cognition proponents that modal, perceptual activity can account for most or all of the cognitive phenomena traditionally viewed as "conceptual". I find that much of the evidence presented as support for either side is misleading, as it is based on the assumption that existing theories are far more complete than they really are. Nevertheless, I conclude that there is enough strong evidence to support several key claims, including the existence of perceptual components in conceptual thought, and the inability of some classes of propositional conceptual system to adequately explain the full range of human conceptual phenomena. TI - Embodied Cognition and the Percept/Concept Distinction KW - categories KW - cognitive KW - computational KW - conceptual KW - embodiment KW - perception AU - Hayward, Michael PY - 1998/// UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.6241 ER -