A theory of reciprocity Export

@article{citeulike:528224, abstract = {People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.}, author = {Falk, Armin and Fischbacher, Urs}, citeulike-article-id = {528224}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825605000254}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4G1PKN5-3/2/d293658b1193f3f8d2b58409db1e9fc6}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {cooperation, economics, game, reciprocity, theory}, month = {February}, number = {2}, pages = {293--315}, posted-at = {2006-08-16 16:42:07}, priority = {2}, title = {A theory of reciprocity}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001}, volume = {54}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:528224 L3 - citeulike-article-id:528224 N2 - People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets. IS - 2 JF - Games and Economic Behavior EP - 315 TI - A theory of reciprocity VL - 54 SP - 293 KW - cooperation KW - economics KW - game KW - reciprocity KW - theory AU - Falk, Armin AU - Fischbacher, Urs PY - 2006/02// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 ER -